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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the role of collective organizations created by producers to comply with the WEEE Directive. There are 
limited case studies on these producer responsibility organizations (PROs) despite the crucial role that they play in Extended 
Producer Responsibility (EPR) schemes. An important aspect in order to evaluate the efficiency of these compliance schemes is 
the analysis of their internal costs including transaction costs. First of all, this research provides an understanding of the Italian 
WEEE system for households WEEE. Then, it focuses on one compliance organization and how it deals with physical, 
informative and financial responsibility that are different aspects of the EPR principle. We provide evidence on the costs incurred 
by the compliance organizations. We briefly describe the transaction costs involved in operating a collective PRO in comparison 
to individual scheme. We investigate the issue with the “ERP ITALIA S.R.L.” case study. This is one of the producer 
responsibility organisations (PROs) operating in Italy and the only pan-European compliance scheme. This will allow future 
comparative studies with the other branches of ERP across Europe.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a 
policy principle which is the basis of the European 
legislation regulating packaging, end-of-life vehicles, 
batteries and waste of electrical and electronic 
equipment (WEEE). The WEEE Directive is the 
result of a long developing process started in April 
1998 as a part of the shift in the European 
environmental legislation from process to product 
(Castell et al., 2004). Eventually, the first issue of the 
Directive was published in January 2003 and it was 
recast in 2012. After more than 10 years, several 
scholars advocate that a great amount of work on the 
topic is still needed. We can assert that the green 
design goal and waste prevention have not proven to 
deliver what expected. If the design for recyclability 
in plastic products has been somehow introduced 
(Corabieru et al., 2014) this is not always the case for 
electric and electronic products (Atasu and Van 
Wassenhove, 2012; Castell et al., 2004; Gottberg et 
al., 2006; Khetriwal et al., 2009; Rotter, 2011; Yu et 
al., 2008).  
The “public good” aspect of recyclability 
prevents the incentive for the producer to design 
devices easy to recycle (Palmer and Walls, 1999). 
Moreover, EEE producers argue that it is difficult to 
design recyclable products when their lifespan is long 
and the recycling technology is unknown (Wagner, 
2009). Therefore, several scholars share the idea that 
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the drive for eco-design is effective only if producers 
are responsible for their own end-of-life products. 
This is also defined as individual producer 
responsibility (Castell et al., 2004; Lifset et al., 
2013). However, this solution would carry important 
transaction costs. The view that the green design is a 
missing achievement is shared by several authors 
(Lifset et al., 2013; Mayers et al., 2011, Mayers and 
Butler, 2013; Özdemir et al., 2012; Smith in OECD, 
2005; Toffel, 2003; Webster and Mitra, 2007). On 
the other hand, the shifting of responsibility for 
recycling targets on producers facilitated recycling in 
all European countries (Massarutto, 2007). 
Moreover, the WEEE collected in Europe has been 
recycled at rates between 80% and 95% (Rotter, 
2011). 
Finally, the overall efficiency of the solutions 
adopted within the EPR scheme is still an open 
question (Lifset et al., 2013; Mayers, 2007; 
Massarutto, 2007, 2014; Palmer and Walls, 1999). 
Any form of intervention by government or non-
government to address market failure must be 
efficient i.e. the benefits must be greater than the 
costs. It is widely recognized that PROs are one of 
the key players of the network design of EPR. 
However, their role is still controversial (Lifset et al., 
2013; Mayers, 2007; Massarutto, 2007; Palmer and 
Walls, 1999). First, there is no clear agreement on the 
outcome they could reach (Massarutto, 2007; 
Mayers, 2007). Second, previous research on detailed 
operations of PROs is quite limited (Lifset et al., 
2013; Mayers and and Butler, 2013). We follow this 
call for a more fine-grained understanding on the 
efficiency of the solutions adopted within EPR 
schemes and for empirical research on compliance 
organisations (Atasu and Van Wassenhove, 2012; 
Khetriwal et al., 2009; Mayers and Butler, 2013; 
Walls, 2011). We focus in this paper on a producer 
responsibility organization (PRO), its responsibilities 
as well as its efficiency issues.  
According to Mayers (2007) in Europe there 
were 10,000 producers and more than 80,000 
European municipal authorities at the time when the 
author wrote the article. A new subject (PRO) was 
created in order to deal with the potential complexity 
of the numerous entities in the field. In fact, as early 
as 2007, in Europe there were 130 PROs established 
to deal with WEEE. On this basis, this research has 
three main objectives. First it explains how the Italian 
WEEE system for households works. Then it 
investigates the critical aspects of one producer 
responsibility organization operating in Italy: ERP 
ITALIA S.R.L. This is performed analyzing the 
physical responsibility, the economic/financial 
responsibility and the informative responsibility. 
Finally, it underlines the internal costs and 
transaction costs involved in operating a PRO using 
the ERP case study. The paper is organized as 
follows. After this introduction, we provide a 
theoretical background followed, in section three, by 
the method that was used. In this section we briefly 
present the case study and the data collection method. 
The results and discussion part contains the analysis 
of ERP case study divided in the physical 
responsibility, informative responsibility and 
economic/financial responsibility. The conclusion 
section provides an overview of the results as well as 
it limitation and the need for future studies.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
According to Goulder and Parry (2008) the 
inability of the market to address externalities from 
pollution is the market failure that seems more 
central to environmental issues. Coase (1960) within 
the New Institutional Economics considers 
externalities a problem of insufficient defined 
property rights. The theory of New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) asserts that the change of property 
rights could force actors to internalize externalities 
(Demsetz, 1967).  
There are several environmental policies that 
address the externality issue. One of these is the 
Extended Producer Responsibility principle, a 
general concept that gradually replaced the product 
take-back approach (Walls, 2011). The WEEE 
Directive includes the EPR principle. The European 
directive changed the property rights among actors 
by shifting of responsibility toward producers and 
away from municipalities. According to Buitelaar 
and Needham (2007), property rights are rules and 
the rules are institutions. When the property rights 
are changed to achieve certain results, these are 
purposeful institutional changes. Property rights and 
transaction costs are fundamentally interlinked, and 
they can be considered as two sides of the same coin 
(Allen, 1991). In his definition property rights are the 
capability to exercise a choice over a good or service 
while the transaction costs are the costs to establish 
and maintain such property rights.  
Changing property rights and appointing 
producers responsible for the end of life products 
have created several positive aspects. Massarutto, 
(2014) points out that the implementation of the EPR 
principle managed to collect and allocate financial 
resources necessary to fuel the waste management 
system for WEEE. One interesting question is why 
producers have created collective systems to comply 
with the directive. According to Fleckinger and 
Glachant (2010) producers created associations 
because bearing the responsibility may be very costly 
for individual producers.  In fact, according to Sachs 
(2006), individual schemes are affected by 
substantial transaction costs.  
On this basis, it is quite natural to investigate 
the PRO approach to ERP requirements in terms of 
responsibilities, production and transaction costs. 
However, empirical measurement of transaction costs 
is problematic (Musole, 2009). In fact, according to 
Buckley and Chapman (1997) it is difficult to 
measure and assess transaction costs as the most 
important of them are the avoided costs that would 
have existed in situations that did not happen. In this 
respect, producers could choose between manage 
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their responsibilities individually or by creating 
organizations.  
In general terms, the management of take-
back schemes can be carried out by third party 
organization (TPO) also known as “compliance 
schemes” (Gregory et al., 2009). The StEP report 
presents two different approaches to TPOs: own-
branded TPOs and non-own-branded TPOs. The 
solution adopted in most cases (like in Italy) by 
producers is the second approach, where the 
compliance schemes collect and treat a share of e-
waste arising in the country regardless of their brand. 
As reported before, according to Atasu and Van 
Wassenhove (2012), there are no individual producer 
operated systems in Europe because they may not be 
cost effective.  
The few cases of producers taking care of 
their own-branded waste products (or individual 
producer responsibility) are developed only in the 
business to business (B2B) sector. Regarding the 
individual producer responsibility in the B2C 
(business to consumer) sector, there are limited cases 
such as HP and DELL Computer who encourage the 
take-back of their products (Van Rossem et al., 
2006). However, this solution applies only to a 
portion of their products and therefore these 
producers also adhere to a PRO to fulfill their 
obligations.   
To summarize, WEEE PROs are a central as 
well as controversial players in the EPR scheme. 
Nevertheless, they have been studied and compared 
only in few works. In this current paper we analyze 
one of the operating collection systems and we give 
some evidence of the structure of the WEEE system 
in Italy. We draw attention on how it fulfils its 
responsibilities, it internal costs including a 
description of transaction costs in comparison to a 
potential individual solution. We present how the 
ERP ITALIA S.R.L. complies with the economic 
responsibility, physical responsibility and 
informative responsibility as described by Linqhqvist 
(1992, 1998). Furthermore, we analyze how ERP 
ITALIA compliance scheme charges its consortium’s 
member.   
 
3. Method 
 
3.1. Case study presentation  
 
The ERP S.R.L. company is part of a broader 
organization named ERP (European Recycling 
Platform) established in 2002 by four producers of 
EEE. It developed the idea of setting the first pan-
European compliance scheme in response to the 
European Union’s groundbreaking directive to 
promote e-waste collection and recycling (Shao, 
2009). ERP works in 16 states and has 2403 
members in the world. So far, it has collected 2 
million tons of e-waste (ERP, 2013). ERP ITALIA 
S.R.L. was established in 2006 and has one 
shareholder i.e. ERP SAS France. Also, ERP 
ITALIA S.R.L has four “founding members” who 
make up the board in charge of the decisions; 35 
“European members” and 2300 “local members” and 
it employs 12 people. In 2012, ERP ITALIA S.R.L. 
collected 12.63% of national e-waste.    
The goals set at heart of the new organization 
in 2002 were (ERP ITALIA S.R.L. – corporate 
profile, March 2013): to stimulate market forces and 
competition; to achieve scale economies to ensure 
competition and efficiency in recycling; to keep low 
overheads; to reduce market price for the highest 
quality available on the market and to support IPR 
(Individual Producer Responsibility). 
ERP ITALIA S.R.L. operates in Italy where a 
national clearing house (CdC RAEE) was created in 
accordance to the Italian regulation. It is owned by 
the 17 Italian WEEE PROs. In 2012 ERP owned 1/9 
of the national clearing house. The primary role of 
the CdC RAEE is to ensure the same market 
conditions to all members. It defines annually the 
market share of each producer and it determines 
which collection sites are assigned to each PRO, on 
the basis of an algorithm. The Italian branch of ERP 
has never been analyzed while the UK branch has 
recently been studied (Butler, 2009; Lee and Shao, 
2009; Mayers, 2007; Mayers and Butler, 2013).  
 
3.2. Data collection  
 
In this section we present the case study of 
ERP ITALIA S.R.L. Following the idea that one of 
the major strengths of case study is the opportunity to 
use different sources of evidence (Yin, 2003), our 
study is based on qualitative and quantitative primary 
and secondary data. We used a wide range of 
sources: reports, studies, company presentations, on 
line publications, company web site, brochures, as 
well as balance sheets (including “explanation 
notes”). We accessed the national clearing house data 
to have useful information on the compliance system. 
We also analyzed the research papers on the 
corporate headquarters and on the English branch of 
ERP. Furthermore, a semi-structured interview was 
utilized in the meeting in order to gain a deep 
knowledge and to attain specific details. The content 
of the interview was disclosed to the company before 
the meeting.  One semi-structured long interview was 
held at the company premises in July 2013 and it 
involved two key employees: the head of operations 
and the head of marketing. The draft document of 
this paper was submitted for checks and approval to 
the financial officer of ERP.  Inputs, clarifications 
and corrections were used to review and improve the 
paper. Additionally, we carried out several interviews 
to different players of the system. The first and most 
important one, was a long interview with the head of 
operations of the national clearing house. Four 
additional interviews were carried out: two with 
different recyclers of WEEE, one with an Italian 
municipality and the last one with the regional 
director of ERP UK. All of these meeting were 
executed at their premises and were very important to 
understand the Italian WEEE system where ERP is 
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included as well as underline the key differences with 
the British WEEE system. Data triangulation was 
used to address the potential problem of construct 
validity (Yin, 2003). The Italian regulation that 
implements the WEEE Directive was also studied 
(Decree n. 151/2005 and following application 
decrees) in order to frame the case study. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
The case study is presented in accordance 
with the theoretical approach of EPR carried out by 
Lindhqvist (1992 and 1998) which distinguishes 
different forms of responsibility: physical 
responsibility, economic responsibility and 
informative responsibility. The physical 
responsibility characterizes the systems when the 
producers have to deal with the physical management 
of the end-of-life products.  
The economic responsibility means that the 
manufacturers bear the full or partial cost for the 
collection, recycling or disposal of the product 
manufactured. The informative responsibility 
requires producer to supply information on the 
environmental property of the products. In the next 
section we present ERP case study within the Italian 
system for WEEE. We distinguish the physical 
responsibility, the financial/economic responsibility 
and the informative responsibility of the compliance 
organization.   
 
4.1. Physical responsibility 
 
In Italy producers can fulfill their physical 
obligations (collection, treatment and recovery) 
either individually or joining a collection system 
according to the national regulation that implement 
the WEEE directive (Decree no. 151/2005). The 
solution adopted by all Italian producers is to join a 
PRO. More precisely, all the 17 existing PROs are 
collective organizations. ERP ITALIA S.R.L is one 
of these. In Italy the national clearing house (CdC 
RAEE) is established by law together with other 
institutes that manage the system (Ministerial decree 
n. 185/2007). Each collection system has to register 
to the CdC RAEE and its main task is to ensure 
uniform and homogeneous conditions to the 
collective systems. Having a national clearing house 
reduces transaction costs related to support and 
administer the program as well as it reduces costs for 
the monitoring operations. CdC RAEE determines 
the market share of each collective system which is 
proportionate to the amount of EEE put on the 
market in the previous year by the producers 
associated to that specific PRO.  
Compliance organizations have to collect e-
waste from the assigned collection points. These 
municipal and the retailers collection points contact 
the national clearing house when the quantity of 
WEEE collected needs to be picked up by the 
compliance organizations. The national clearing 
house assigns the collection sites in the national 
territory to the compliance organizations based on a 
complex algorithm, which incorporates several 
variables. The variables taken in consideration are: 
the quantity of WEEE collected in each collection 
point, the physical allocation of the collection point, 
the ease to reach the collection point and so on. 
Compensations on quantities collected are made the 
year after by reassigning the collecting points to the 
producers. In this way there are not fee 
compensations between producers. Therefore, ERP 
ITALIA S.R.L states that PROs do not compete on e-
waste collection, since the collection activity is 
decided by CdC RAEE but they compete on the 
services provided to the customers.  
Transaction costs related to research and 
information gathering are reduced during the 
collection phase. This is quite different from the 
situation in the UK, for example, where ERP- UK 
(like the other British PROs) has to sign agreements 
with a sufficient number of collection points in order 
to reach the amount of e-waste collected that fulfil 
the responsibility of the members of the system 
(Mayer et al., 2013). In this respect, for producers 
enrolled in Italian collective PROs, transaction costs 
related to e-waste procurement is significantly 
reduced thanks to the role played by the national 
clearing house. Moreover, if we consider that an 
individual responsibility organization should collect 
and treat a share of its own e-waste by setting a 
separate collection and treatment route, this would 
create considerable transaction costs such as research 
costs, information gathering costs; contracting costs; 
monitoring/detection costs and  
prosecution/inducement/conflict resolution costs. 
In Italy there are two different types of 
collection points: retailers collection points (“Luoghi 
di raggruppamento – LdR”) and municipal collection 
points (“centri di raccolta – CdR” or “ecopiazzole 
comunali”). By law CdR must accept the e-waste 
from the local LdR. However, if the LdR is too big 
for the local CdR then PRO collects e-waste directly 
from the retailer collection point and sent to the 
treatment facility. The compliance organizations 
through the CdC RAEE recognize incentives to the 
collection sites which reach some defined threshold. 
These compensation fees are regulated by deals 
signed by CdC RAEE, the national association of 
municipalities and the retailer organization.  
Producers do not have property rights on e-
waste, nor PRO. The property of the e-waste belongs 
to the CdR or LdR when is discharged by end users 
and it is then owned by recyclers when it reaches 
their premises. PROs don't have the property on e-
waste: they offer a service to pass them from the 
collection points to the recycler points. When the 
CdR or LdR collect enough e-waste, they contact the 
CDC RAEE. Then CDC RAEE contacts the 
collection scheme that has in charge that specific 
collection point. In this way, possible changes due to 
the reassignment of collection point to another PRO 
do not create a disservice to third parties. Typical 
transaction costs due to research and information 
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gathering are reduced. CDC RAEE established a 
“maximum time of intervention” i.e. the maximum 
time from the moment in which the subscriber (either 
CdR or LdR) requires the intervention and the 
moment in which the PRO withdraws the WEEE 
from the collection point. In 2012 ERP ITALIA 
S.R.L reached on average 98.38% of the target. Then 
each PRO establishes a deal with transporters and 
recyclers to perform the operations. ERP ITALIA 
S.R.L has few contracts with companies that 
transport and recycle the e-waste. These agreements 
reduce transaction costs if compared to an individual 
producer organization which has to find, collect and 
treat its own products. Several transaction costs are 
reduces such as research and information gathering 
costs, contracting costs; monitoring/detection costs 
and prosecution/inducement conflict resolution costs. 
On the other hand, compliance organizations can 
provide a stable flow of e-waste to the contractors 
(logistic and treatment operators) with contractual 
conditions fixed for few years. This situation reduces 
the problem of hold-up especially for the recyclers 
and it allows long term investments. 
The recyclers have to be accredited as 
enterprises of the treatment of WEEE by the CdC 
RAEE in accordance with its technical specification. 
The accreditation is based on a specific audit 
conducted by third-party certifiers which are selected 
and approved by the CdC RAEE. In 2013 (CdC 
RAEE web site) there are 113 waste treatment plants. 
Each of them is accredited for one or more of the five 
groups of WEEE (R1-R5 following in the Italian 
legislation). According to the data provided by ERP 
ITALIA S.R.L, the recycling performance (including 
energy recovery) reached 90% in 2012.  
 
4.2. Financial/economic responsibility 
 
Producers are responsible for financing of 
collection, treatment, recovery and environmentally 
sound disposal of WEEE. As for the physical 
responsibility, the legislation allows to fulfil this 
obligation either individually or by joining a 
collective scheme (WEEE Directive). The Italian 
regulation (Decree no 151/2005) concedes the same 
options to producers. ERP founders claim that they 
contributed in changing the paradigm in European e-
waste recycling by breaking with the monopolistic 
mentality and introducing competition among PROs 
(Shao, 2009). This allowed ERP to reduce average 
take-back costs significantly (Atasu and Van 
Wassenhove, 2012). According to Mayers and Butler 
(2013), EPR was founded by producers in order to 
have more control and lower costs in the delivery of 
take-back services for WEEE. In order to investigate 
the reduction of average take-back costs and 
therefore the improved efficiency, we analyze the 
internal costs of the PRO. We assess the cost 
structure of ERP ITALIA S.R.L. in the last three year 
(2010-2012) (Table 1). Following the Remedia’s 
scheme (2012), we classify the costs in the following 
categories: treatment costs, logistic costs, 
performance bonuses (provided to collection points), 
communication costs and structure costs (including 
national clearing house).  
The break-down information on treatment and 
logistic costs in 2010 and 2012 have been provided 
directly from the ERP. Total treatment and logistic 
costs decreased over time for two main reasons: the 
company became more efficient and the value of the 
metal recovered from e-waste increased. More 
specifically, in 2012, ERP managed to reduce these 
costs thanks to the new business model that allows 
ERP to select contractors in the market instead of 
having one single dealer as in year 2010. In fact, 
while up to the first part of 2011, the general 
contractor was in charge of the selection of suppliers 
and the pick-up activities, from the second part of 
2011 ERP internalized these activities with an 
appropriate internal structure. This new business 
model explains the increase of the structural costs 
and, more important, it clarifies the decrease in the 
cost per ton of e-waste managed by the consortium. 
On the other hand, the cost allocation under 
collective systems is a crucial aspect of EPR design 
(Atasu and Van Wassenhove, 2012; Fleckinger and 
Glachant, 2010; Lifset et al., 2013). It can influence 
its efficiency as well as the incentives to waste 
prevention. Therefore, we analyze in detail how this 
compliance scheme works out the cost allocation 
among its members.  
According to Forslind (2009), the EPR 
program can be implemented with two different 
financial schemes: “pay-as-you-go system” (PAYG) 
or “insurance system”. 
 
Table 1. Cost classification for ERP ITALIA S.R.L. during years 2010, 2011 and 2012 
 
 
 
YEAR 
2012 % 
PER 
TON YEAR 2011 % PER TON YEAR 2010 % 
PER 
TON 
Treatment costs € 1,887,389 23.59 € 62.76 € 3,158,423 26.79 € 85.42 € 3,241,142 30.98 €96.77 
Logistic costs € 3,505,152 43.81 € 116.55 € 5,865,642 49.76 €158.64 €6,019,265 57.53 €179.72 
Performance 
bonuses 
€860,421 10.76 €28.61 € 1,052,545 8.93 € 28.47 €799,386 7.64 €23.87 
Communication 
costs 
€56,987 0.71 1.89 € 0 0 € 0 €0 0 0 
Structure costs €1,690,087 21.13 56.20 € 1,712,107 14.52 € 46.30 € 402,493 3.85 12.02 
Total costs €8,000,036 100 €266.02 € 11,788,717 100 € 318.83 €10,462,286 100 € 312.38 
Structure costs= tot WEEE production costs – (treatment costs + logistic costs + performance bonuses + communication costs). 2010: 
33,492,450 kg collected by ERP; 13.65% ERP share of national collection rate; 2011: 36,975,227 kg collected by ERP; 14.22% ERP share of 
national collection rate; 2012: 30.073.569 kg collected by ERP; 12.63% ERP share of national collection rate 
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The PAYG is based on the costs incurred 
when the products reach their End-of-Life. With the 
insurance system, producers pay one contribution per 
product sold (Put on Market - PoM) and this will 
cover the costs of the end-of-life management when 
the product is dismissed. 
ERP ITALIA charges the operation costs to its 
members according to one of the following option: 
the “collected and treated” (same as PAYG system) 
and PoM tariff (same as the insurance system). ERP 
promotes the first option. According to the managers 
of ERP ITALIA S.R.L., the costs paid by their 
members are as low as possible and they charge 
producers only the actual costs. These costs are 
classified by ERP ITALIA S.R.L. in: 1) membership 
fee (i.e. general costs); 2) registration fee (i.e. cost for 
the local government); 3) operation costs (i.e. 
compliance costs). There are two options for the 
“membership fee”: “local membership” and 
“European membership”. On one hand, the “local 
membership” is defined in each Member State and in 
Italy it is about €200 for customers that have to treat 
up to 5 tons of EEE. For the customers that have 
more than 5 tons of EEE, the membership fee is 
proportionate to the quantity of EEE put on the 
market (PoM). This fee covers the functionality and 
fixed costs. On the other hand, the “European 
membership” works in the same way but the 
agreement covers at least three European Countries. 
Moreover, the “Registration fee” is used to 
register the producer to the national system. In Italy 
for example these fees include: €16 for the stamp 
duty; € 168 for the government and revenue agency 
tax; €30 for the Chamber of Commerce. The 
“operation costs” i.e. the compliance costs can be 
computed in two ways: a) PoM put on market and b) 
collected and treated. The PoM tariff is set either by 
units or by kg of product put on the market. The 
“collected and treated option”, charges the costumers 
for what it is really collected that year and it is 
computed by multiplying the quantity times the unit 
costs. The advantage of PoM is that the customer 
pays a predefined amount of money. The 
disadvantage of such system is that members have to 
pay in advance.  
The problem for the compliance scheme using 
this system is to fix the appropriate fee which covers 
all the costs without accumulating financial reserves. 
Of course, the compliance solution in place of many 
single producers solutions reduces the transactions 
costs related to research and information gathering; 
support and administration of the ongoing program; 
contracting; monitoring/detection and 
prosecution/inducement/ conflict resolution. ERP 
ITALIA S.R.L. prefers to charge members according 
to the “collected and treated” way. In order to 
compute the “collected and treated” tariff, ERP 
ITALIA S.R.L. multiplies the PoM tariff (fee per ton) 
by the expected rate of return.  The PoM tariff is a 
fixed tariff computed per ton per each of the five 
WEEE groups (R1-R5). The expected rate of return 
is: tons of WEEE collected in year t+1 divided by 
tons of EEE sold in year t. Example tons of EEE sold 
in 2012 = 10,000; tons of WEEE collected in 2013 = 
12,500; expected rate of return 125%. Then ERP 
ITALIA S.R.L. shares the costs between producers 
based on their market share of the previous year. For 
ERP ITALIA S.R.L. this is the correct application of 
art 10 and 11 of DM 151/2005 as producers pay in 
function of their market share of the year before. 
ERP ITALIA S.R.L. points out the problem of setting 
the right tariff and gets the financial sheet balance. 
This was especially difficult when the systems were 
set up. According to ERP ITALIA S.R.L., the tariffs 
applied to its members are the lowest possible and 
there are no reserves set aside.  
It is very important to point out that these two 
ways that PRP uses to compute the fee and charge 
the consortium’s members do not include any 
incentive to eco-design. Design incentives come from 
the fees differentiation paid for EoL management 
(Sander, 2007). ERP ITALIA S.R.L. does not apply 
any individual producer responsibility as there is any 
cost sharing system based on the actual cost 
contribution of the EoL product.  
In fact, the ERP and other major EE producers 
say that in order to invest in product recoverability 
producers need control over final treatment of their 
products. For Özdemir et al. (2012) collective 
responsibility does not give any incentive to 
producers for product recoverability improvement. 
This vision is supported by other studies (Castell et 
al., 2004; Mayers et al., 2011; Mayers and Butler, 
2013; Smith in OECD, 2005; Webster and Mitra, 
2007). Nowadays, individual operating systems can 
be very expensive and brand sorting activities too 
costly.  
 
4.3. Informative responsibility 
 
When responsibilities and costs are shifted to 
collective actors like PROs, which are easier to 
control, the incentive to comply is strengthened 
(Massarutto, 2014) and transaction costs are reduced. 
As reported by Atasu and Van Wassenhove, (2012) 
regulators need to take into account costs of 
monitoring and controlling take-back systems. In this 
respect, the Italian law delegated this duty to the CdC 
Raee that must collect and process the information 
provided by the 17 PROs. This reduces the 
transaction costs, if we compare a solution that 
involves a myriad of individual PROs established by 
individual producers. It reduces research and 
information gathering; lobbying and public 
participation costs; support and administration of the 
ongoing program; monitoring/detection.  
CdC RAEE has a national call centre where 
municipal and retailer collection points can submit 
requests for waste collection and citizens can address 
general information. In this way any change in the 
allocation of collection point to a PRO does not 
create disservices to the users. This reduces 
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transaction costs for the actors involved such as 
research and information gathering costs. On the 
other hand, the national clearing house gets 
information and controls the system as well as 
provides equal possibilities to all parties involved. As 
reported before, producers pay a fee to the chamber 
of commerce which keeps the public registers of 
producers (www.registroaee.it). Each producer and 
PRO has to enroll in this public register. Moreover, 
producers have several declarations to fulfill such as 
PoM (quantity of EEE put on market) during the 
previous year, by the 30th of May; the quantity of e-
waste collected by PRO on behalf of its members and 
the percentage of e-waste recovered (using a form 
called MUD “single model statement”). Usually ERP 
is also in charge of declaring the PoM on behalf of its 
members and it provides additional service. In this 
way ERP can also check the volumes of the PoM by 
its members reducing the monitoring/detection cost. 
In case of differences in volumes, ERP can conduct 
an audit to the producer.  
ERP ITALIA S.R.L. declares a complexity of 
documentation required by the Italian central 
government. Moreover, the requirements are 
different in each member state. A statement by the 
European commission acknowledges that 
improvements under the Directive are necessary in 
order to harmonize the national registration and 
reporting requirements. Member States' registers for 
producers of EEE will be integrated more closely. 
Moreover, the Commission will adopt a harmonized 
format to be used for the supply of information. 
Consequently, administrative burdens are expected to 
decrease (European Commission, 2012).  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
After 10 years from the WEEE Directive 
publication it is widely recognized that PROs 
(producer responsibility organizations) play a central 
role in EPR schemes. Despite this fact, empirical 
investigations on EPR implementation and on 
compliance scheme solutions are still limited. This 
fact has raised several calls to investigate these 
aspects. This paper provides an overview of the 
Italian WEEE system for households. It then studies 
one of the compliance organizations with attention on 
how it complies with the physical responsibility, 
economic/financial responsibility and informative 
responsibility.  
The paper provides evidence of the costs 
incurred by the collective system including the 
transaction costs. The research also explains how the 
operations of the ERP ITALY srl are carried out as 
the previous research on this aspect is limited. 
Indeed, PROs play a pivotal role in the 
implementation of EPR scheme as they represent an 
important interface to organize the financial 
transactions, collection activities, and 
communications among governments, producers, 
waste companies, retailers, and municipal authorities. 
Furthermore, this centralized organization offers long 
term agreements, a more stable market, a reduced 
hold-up risk. Finally, it encourages specific 
investments in the recycling industry as well as it 
counterbalances its market power. Such 
centralization of activities coordinated by a collective 
system reduces transaction costs if compared to a 
multitude of individual producer organizations. The 
results show that, as pointed out by the previous 
literature, producers create these organizations 
because they reduce transaction costs if compared to 
individual compliance organizations. Furthermore, 
this paper discloses how compliance organizations, 
such as ERP, allocate costs among its members.  
The research demonstrates the composition of 
internal costs of ERP S.R.L. ITALIA over time. In 
this respect, the paper fills a gap in the literature as 
only important but few case studies on WEEE 
collective systems are carry out so far. The paper has 
some limitations. First of all, we investigated only 
one compliance organization and its internal costs 
over a limited period of time. Second, the analysis of 
the revenues aspects of the collective system would 
have provided a better understanding of the scheme. 
Future research is needed in order to provide insight 
of the functioning of other PROs in Italy and in other 
member states. Additional investigation on other 
collective systems will allow interesting comparisons 
on the adopted solutions. Research on best practices 
solutions for the WEEE system would be also 
interesting for the business sector.  
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